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Liability Rules, Collective Organizations and the Provision of Food Safety 
 
There are many ways to improve food safety.  It is well-recognized in the literature that private bilateral 
contracts, perhaps including third-party private certification, may substitute for or complement 
government regulation.  However, these two options are not the only ones available. For example, in 
the last decade we have seen produce grower organizations using marketing orders or agreements to 
establish food safety duties among their growers—the most well known is the California Leafy Greens 
Marketing Agreement.  These establish responsibilities for growers and change the relationship between 
producers and buyers.  Informational asymmetries, for instance, may mean that traceability, and thus 
culpability, would be very difficult for either consumers or government agents to determine.   
  As a mediator of private self-regulation, the role of traditional collective marketing institutions, 
such as marketing agreements or marketing orders, in promoting food safety is still in its infancy.  The 
aggregation of private interests adds an additional complexity to a standard “private” contract between 
two parties; for instance, finding common ground among heterogeneous players can be quite difficult.  
This is the source of another potential difference among government regulation, collective self-
regulation and individual self-regulation. We review the types of collective organizations that have 
emerged and construct a theoretical model that includes critical factors influencing food safety 
incentives in order to identify when industry members have an incentive to engage in collective actions 
that improve food safety outcomes.  
  One important consideration appears to be the degree of ambiguity associated with the 
possibility of new government food safety regulation.  How stringent will these regulations be?  How 
costly?  Will there be flexibility in attaining goals?  Will government regulation pre-empt private 
initiatives? These questions are familiar ones for economists interested in food safety issues.  Often 
there are no clear answers that can be quantified using standard approaches.  An important 
complicating factor is the ambiguity regarding the effect of specific actions or sets of actions on food 
safety.  We model these ambiguities using fuzzy sets. 
 
Marketing orders and marketing agreements 
In addition to voluntary farmer’s cooperatives, there are two other mechanisms for producers and/or 
handlers to negotiate and enforce agreements related to food marketing, marketing orders and 
marketing agreement.  These latter two instruments were authorized under the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act (AMAA) of 1937, and were mainly established to maintain stable and (relatively) high 
prices for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce (National Agricultural Law Center, n.d.).  The 
primary difference between marketing orders and agreements is that agreements only legally bind 
“handlers” that participate voluntarily, whereas marketing orders are legally binding on all producers in 
a geographic area covered by the marketing order (National Agricultural Law Center, n.d.).   
  For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on marketing orders.  Marketing orders may be 
authorized at the state or federal level.  Federal marketing orders  are issued by the Secretary of 
Agriculture.  Marketing orders are rather unique in that growers in a given industry in a specific region 
generally request marketing agreements and/or orders, which are then issued by the Secretary of 
Agriculture.  In order to be implemented, marketing orders must be “approved” by either 2/3rds of 
affected growers, or growers of 2/3
rd of affected volumes (7 USC §608(c)).  Thus, the mechanism has 
aspects of self-regulation, but with required agency approval and with back-up by the courts since the 
regulations are legally binding (c.f. Crespi and Sexton, 2003).   
  Crespi and Sexton (2003) note that after early challenges to the law few substantive legal cases 
have been brought challenging the act until recently.  Currently, the most controversial section of the 
law pertains to the generic advertising; with many cases being brought before the courts, and including 
three cases brought before the US Supreme Court on first-amendment grounds (Carmen, 2007). Though 2 
 
results are somewhat conflicting, it would appear that generic advertising fee assessments are still 
allowed (do not violate the first amendment). There have also been some challenges to the inspection 
provisions found in the raisin marketing order, for example a series of related cases brought by Lion 
Brothers (Lion Bros v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Not reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2089809 (E.D. Cal. 
2005); In re Lion Raisins, Inc., 64 Agric. Dec. 27 (2005)(Decision and Order);  Lion Raisins, Inc., v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agriculture, Case No. 1:05-CV-00640 OWW SMS, Not reported in F.Supp.2d, 2008 WL 783337 
(E.D. Cal. 2008)).   
  Relatively recently, these instruments have also addressed food safety, including provisions in 
the California Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Order, the proposed national Leafy Greens 
Marketing Agreement, as well as in pistachio and almond marketing orders (Carmen, 2007).   It is not 
entirely clear that the AMAA actually authorizes food safety provisions
1
  Less attention in the academic literature has been given to the use of marketing orders to devise 
and enforce commodity quality, which in turn could include safety provisions.  We consider the 
circumstances under which producers would agree to legally binding commitments on food safety, given 
the type of regulation promulgated.  In terms of regulation type, orders can contain very specific actions 
required by the producer, or contain broader, vaguer language regarding actions required on the part of 
growers.  As discussed more fully below, it is costly to make agreements on precise regulations either 
where the necessary scientific information to draft precise rules is imperfect or where producers are 
highly differentiated.  High costs result because simple, but precise, rules will over-burden some growers 
and under-burden others and/or because very detailed, grower specific rules are too time-consuming to 
construct or simply not possible to construct given the state of technical knowledge.  More general 
“standards” allow growers to take least-cost actions consistent with meeting the standard.  On the other 
hand, it is far simpler to monitor and enforce precise regulations than vague standards.    
 (O’Neill Institute, 2009).  In 
August 2010, the US District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia will allow a case brought by 
organic almond growers against enforcement of the pasteurization provisions in the almond marketing 
order.  This case highlights the  difficulty of reaching consensus in an industry with heterogeneous 
producer interests. However, as argued by Carmen (2007), to the extent that such provisions enhance 
consumer confidence and prevent costly recalls and/or demand shifts due to a food poisoning events, 
they do lead to more stable, orderly markets and higher prices, which are the key goals of the AMAA.   
  Grower heterogeneity in terms of the size of operation is another important consideration that 
can hinder the formation of a voluntary organization designed to promoted food safety.  Heterogeneity 
can affect the formation of the organization in two ways.  First, there may be economies of scale in food 
safety enhancement activities, due to different technology choices available to operations with 
sufficient volume.  Second, fixed fees per operation, such as inspection or certification charges, have a 
disproportionate effect on small operations.  One way of mitigating the latter is for large producers to 
subsidize small producers.  In practice, per unit assessments are generally used to support marketing 
orders.  When these assessments are used to fund producers’ activities to satisfy operation-level 
requirements, small producers are, effectively, subsidized by larger ones.  One example of such an 
activity is the development of good agricultural practices for  strawberries and associated worker 
training methods and materials by the California Strawberry Commission, which are available to all 
growers without charge.  This group is funded by a per unit assessment.  
 
Crisp standards and fuzzy regulations 
                                                           
1 The statute states that the terms may include “Limiting…” the quality of the commodity ( 7 U.S.C. §§ 608(c)(6)(A)), which 
might be construed to include limiting through food safety.  Explicit allowance for food safety in food marketing orders was 
included in drafts of the 2008 Farm Bill, but was subsequently omitted since “conferees indicated that such programs already 
are authorized under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935” (Becker 2008).   3 
 
One of the key benefits to individuals of well-defined rules is reduced legal uncertainty, since such rules 
provide clear notice of what is and is not unlawful (c.f. Posner, 2007; Kaplow, 1992; Schlag, 1985).  
Monitoring  and enforcement costs are also likely to be lower because:  1) settlements and pleas are 
more likely to occur since litigants are more likely to precisely estimate their chances of winning in court 
(Posner, 2007), 2) rules are less costly to adjudicate in court and should be handled more timely putting 
less pressure on court dockets (Posner, 1988), and 3) similarly situated litigants are more likely to be 
treated similarly by the legal system, providing stability to the legal system and bolstering the fairness of 
the system, at least ex ante (Schlag, 1985; Kennedy, 1976).  However, it is more expensive to draft a 
well-defined and effective rule, and even a well-defined rule is likely to lead to both under- and over-
inclusiveness (Posner, 2007; Kaplow, 1992).  For instance, specifying that a certain technology be used in 
order to reduce a certain environmental harm may well lead to over-protection for firms that do not 
face high risks of causing that harm, and under-protection from firms that face very high risks of causing 
that harm
2
  The major benefit from fuzzy standards identified in the literature is the ability of the regulated 
entity to take into account individual-specific circumstances in order to reach the goals of the standard 
(Kaplow, 1992; Kennedy, 1976).  Standards should then reduce the costs associated with under- and 
over-inclusiveness of rules.  However, if the regulated person or firm believes he is complying with the 
spirit of the law, but is brought up in court anyway, type I and type II errors are more likely to occur (Fon 
and Parisi, 2007).  The resolution to a bright-line rule is only dependent on the facts in evidence (so 
errors may still result given quality of the evidence), but resolution of a fuzzy standards further requires 
the factfinder to determine if the facts in evidence are “reasonable” or accord with some other vague 
and/or ambiguous standard.  Thus, the gains from limiting under- and over-inclusiveness ex ante under a 
fuzzy standard are likely to be mitigated by greater type II errors if the matter is litigated ex post.  
Finally, rules reduce judicial discretion (Fon and Parisi, 2007; Sunstein, 1995).  In the administrative 
agency context, Sunstein (1995) argues that rules should be the norm to limit discretion of the 
administrative agency, whose rulemaking powers have  been delegated by Congress but whose 
personnel are not elected officials; Kaplow (1992) also gives an example of discretion given to the 
administrative agency’s monitoring a vague definition of “toxic substances”.   
. 
  Comparing the effects of rules and standards on the functioning of the legal system as a whole, 
a number of authors have posited that standards are more likely to be preferred where the regulated 
entities are more heterogeneous (c.f. Fon and Parisi, 2007; Kaplow, 1992; Kennedy, 1976).  While fuzzy 
standards reduce under- and over-inclusiveness, from society’s point of view, type I and type II errors 
are also costly and should be considered when comparing fuzzy standards to bright-line rules.  There has 
been less attention in the literature in analyzing and comparing the likely difference in these two 
sources of error across rules versus standards.  Fon and Parisi (2007) evaluate the difference between 
the two where legal rules might become obsolete due to changes in the external environment; they 
hypothesize that standards would be preferred in contexts subject to frequent external changes that 
would make well-specified rules obsolete.   
  While the Fon and  Parisi (2007) model assumes that increasing specificity of the legal rule 
increases its value in terms of reduced legal uncertainty, the implicit value function leaves open exactly 
how rules become “more specific”, and does not explicitly address the relationship between rule 
specificity and compliance costs on the part of those subject to the regulation.  As such, the model is 
divorced from the literature on public enforcement and optimal compliance.  There is a very large 
                                                           
2 An example is provided by the U.S. coal industry.  Western coal is cleaner than Eastern coal; a law that required a 
specific technology for all firms would lead to similar increased costs for all firms, an “over-reduction” of pollution 
for Western firms and an “under-reduction” of pollution at Eastern firms.  If the goal is to reduce regional (or 
national) pollution, then allowing two technologies would lead to the same total reduction at lower cost. 4 
 
literature on optimal fines and inspection rates, beginning with Becker (1968), with a great many 
extensions to the original model including Goroupa (1997), and Polinsky and Shavell (2000).  What these 
models have in common is that it is assumed that the rule itself is well-defined and completely 
understood by the regulator as well as those regulated, e.g. a fixed amount of emissions per some unit 
output over some time interval.  While the parties may have asymmetric information over either their 
culpability in the damages and/or the total damage, there is no vagueness or ambiguity in interpreting 
the standard on which the private party’s guilt or innocence will depend (c.f. Innes, 2004).  McCarthy 
(2010) takes an initial step in tying together the optimal fine and rule specificity literature.  The author 
models the regulatory agency’s decision whether to choose a well-defined rule versus a fuzzy standard, 
given heterogeneous firm behavior and adjudication errors.  Results indicate that the regulatory agency 
will prefer well-defined rules where heterogeneity is lower, and where asymmetric information is 
greater ex ante but where costs of gathering evidence ex post are relatively low.  Additionally, firms with 
larger potential damage are likely to prefer well-defined rules vis-à-vis small damage firms, and all firms 
are likely to prefer well-defined rules where type 1 errors are high.   
  In this paper, we also combine insights from the optimal regulation literature and the rule-
precision literatures.  Here, however, the focus is on incentives for homogeneous firms to voluntarily 
devise internally agreed-upon food safety regulations (e.g. through proposing a marketing order which is 
subsequently legally binding on all relevant producers/handlers).  A well-defined set of rules would 
specify in detail the actions to be undertaken by all relevant parties.  A fuzzy standard, however, might 
look something like the “Good Agricultural Practices” (GAP) guidelines developed by the USDA.  The GAP 
manual in fact begins by noting that guidelines were developed specifically so that individual farmers or 
handlers could structure their own actions based on their unique circumstances while still maintaining 
“good” practices.  The regulator can choose to accept and enforce the voluntarily devised agreement or 
instead choose whether or not to set a simple but well-defined rule.   In the model developed below we 
consider the incentives for the group to voluntarily devise rules given the liability they are subject to if 




This analysis compares the choices of two firms and a regulator regarding the provision of food safety.  
Two types of firm heterogeneity are considered.  In the first, firms are heterogeneous in terms of their 
market shares, capturing heterogeneity in fixed costs.  In the second firms are heterogeneous in terms 
of their market shares and the cost of providing any specific action that affects food safety, capturing 
heterogeneity in both fixed and variable costs.   
  The [0,1] interval is the set of all actions A that affect food safety.  Actions can be considered 
bundles of specific food safety practices.  There are two potential food safety outcomes: a bad event 
occurs, and a bad event does not occur. The realized outcome is affected by A.  All parties observe A; no 
costly monitoring is required.
3
                                                           
3 While in practice marketing agreements and marketing orders assess their members’ volume-based fees in order 
to undertake auditing activities, including this reality in the model would not alter its qualitative results. 
  The relationship between A and the resulting food safety outcome is not 
precise. This is one of the two sources of ambiguity included in the model. To represent this situation we 
define A’s membership in two fuzzy sets, SAFE and UNSAFE. A’s degree of membership in SAFE, μSAFE, 
represents the extent to which A is thought to improve actively one or more aspects of food safety.  A’s 
membership in not SAFE, the complement of safe, equals 1-μSAFE. It can be interpreted as the extent to 
which it’s possible that A has no positive effect on food safety.  A’s degree of membership in UNSAFE, 
μUNSAFE, represents the possible extent to which A reduces actively one or more aspects of food safety. 
A’s membership in not UNSAFE, the complement of UNSAFE, equals 1-μUNSAFE. It can be interpreted as 5 
 
the extent to which it’s possible that A has no negative effect on food safety. For example, washing 
produce may reduce contamination by certain agents.  On the other hand, aggregating produce into 
large batches for washing may spread contamination by other agents.    Essentially, because no one has 
complete scientific information both of these fuzzy sets and their complements should be included in 
the decision-making analysis. For example, rules specifying that cows not be pastured within distance of 
fresh produce fields are generally thought to make food no more UNSAFE.  However, the active effect 
(SAFE) is not known with much precision at all, although presumably greater distances are safer.
4
Information.  All players observe whether or not a food safety failure occurs.  Firms know the 
membership of each A in the fuzzy sets SAFE and UNSAFE and the actions undertaken by all firms.  The 
regulator can determine the firm’s action costlessly ex post if a bad event occurs. The regulator has only 
imprecise information regarding the firm’s action, modeled as knowledge regarding its membership in 
the fuzzy set SAFE.  Effectively, the regulator identifies the “most possible” contribution of the firm’s 
action to the realization of the bad event, based on imperfect and ambiguous information.  The degree 
of ambiguity is different for firms and regulators.  
 Jim 
Prevor, a produce industry member and commentator, writes “The reality is that we know very little 
about food safety.  Nobody knows the migration rate of E. coli O157 or how far a filth fly can carry a 
pathogen.  In the absence of definitive answers, food safety on the farm is a continuum, not an 
absolute.” (Prevor 2010). 
Consequences of food safety failure. We characterize a bad event as a cost incurred by members of 
society outside the MO, such as foodborne illness.  If a bad event K occurs, its magnitude is fixed and 
also denoted by K.  In addition to these direct costs, there is a negative, multiplicative price shock γ, 
which reduces firms’ profits.  (For convenience, we assume that this shock is realized 
contemporaneously, allowing us to utilize a static framework.)  The existence of this price shock 
provides the possibility that a private incentive for firms to engage in a positive A exists.  A affects the 
likelihood that the event occurs, Pr(A).  We obtain a crisp probability of the occurrence of a bad event by 
using a defuzzification rule defined over μSAFE and μUNSAFE. 
Profit maximization. For convenience, we will refer to the industry group as a marketing order or MO.  
The individual firms and the MO choose A in order to maximize profits.  Both firms and the MO are 
assumed to act perfectly competitively in the market for output. We assume that A is separable from all 
other production decisions and set all other production costs to zero, normalize quantity to 1, and 
normalize price in the absence of a negative food safety event to 1 and the price reduction when a 
negative food safety event occurs is δ(A), so that the expected price is 1-δ(A). Given these assumptions, 
profits are defined as 1 − 𝑐(𝐴) − 𝑑(𝐴), where c(A) is the cost of undertaking A and d(A) is the expected 
cost of damage payments associated with bad outcomes.  The function c(A) is assumed to be strictly 
convex, and c(0)=0.  Damages d(A) depend on the legal doctrine.    
Social welfare.  When assessing the firm’s degree of negligence, the regulator wishes to maximize 
expected social welfare, defined as the profits of the firms/MO less the effect of bad events on 
consumers net of damages paid to consumers by the firm responsible. While this formal specification is 
somewhat unconventional within the law and economics literature, it is intended to capture the 
informal sense of whether or not an action is “reasonable.”  Practically, it is not possible to ensure that a 
bad event will never occur.  Thus, determining reasonableness requires balancing various 
considerations.  Maximizing social welfare is simply one way of specifying how the regulator will 
undertake this balancing. 
Liability rules.    The regulator specifies the liability rule governing negative food safety events, e.g. 
whether strict liability will apply or whether a negligence standard will apply.  Under strict liability, firms 
will pay damages whenever a bad event occurs, regardless of what actions they take to improve food 
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safety.  If a negligence standard is chosen, the regulator also sets standards that determine which 
actions will be found negligent.
5  Strict liability requires that the firm  fully compensate affected 
members of society whenever a bad event occurs, regardless of A.  As such it corresponds to a crisp rule 
over outcomes.  Under negligence, the regulator evaluates the firm’s action ex post and determines 
whether or not the firm must compensate affected consumers
6
  As discussed previously, under a strict liability standard the firm is culpable regardless of the 
actions it has taken to reduce the likelihood of a negative food safety event.  Under strict liability, there 
is no need for the regulator to assess the firm’s action. Under a negligence standard the regulator must 
determine the firm’s culpability.  We model the determination of culpability under the negligence 
standard as the regulator’s assessment of the extent to which the firm’s chosen A is “not safe,” which 
we define as equal to 1- μSAFE.  This definition can be interpreted as follows: the firm’s culpability 
depends on the reasonableness of the contribution of its action to actively (positively) affecting food 
safety, but does not depend on the passive contribution of the action to not making food less safe.   
.  As such it corresponds to a fuzzy 
standard over actions. For simplicity, we assume that damages paid exactly equal the damages imposed 
on affected consumers under both liability rules.   
  In theory, a negligence claim can be enforced in the absence of a standard set by the regulator. 
There would simply be a case-by-case determination regarding the “reasonableness” of firms’ actions.  
In practices, standards such as Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs) send signals to firms and adjudicators, 
and should influence the enforcement and imposition of fines.  Here we impose a specific structure, and 
require that the “standard” set by the regulator is the actual standard applied to determine negligence.  
In practice, not meeting GAPs would most likely be sufficient to establish a presumption of liability, as 
modeled here, but meeting GAPS would not be sufficient to establish no liability. 
Timing.  The model evaluates the incidence of various institutional combinations.  As such, it is a static 
model.  Firms’ expectations regarding the regulator’s ex post assessment of culpability are assumed to 
be consistent with the regulator’s assessment.  A natural next step is to examine a two-period model.  
The second period would assess the incidence of the institutional combination chosen by the regulator 
in the first period in order to maximize expected social welfare.  In a two-period model the regulator’s 
welfare-maximizing assessment of culpability would need to be examined for time consistency.  An 
approach that could be implemented within a static model would be for firms to have fuzzy beliefs 
regarding the regulator’s assessment of the reasonableness of any A. 
 
Simulation model specification 
The conceptual framework is operationalized within a simulation model using the following 
specifications and parameter values.  As defined above, 
(1)   A ε [0,1]. 
The cost of A is a convex function, 
(2)  c(A)=A
C, C=2. 
As A increases the possibility that it increases the degree of food safety increases,  
                                                           
5 As developed more fully below, we presume the regulator can fine firms for causing damage, either under strict 
liability or negligence.  The model specified in this paper is a simplification of very complex enforcement 
mechanisms. Currently, the FDA has only limited authority to assess civil monetary fines (Washington Legal 
Foundation, 2003); however, the FDA has imposed fines based on common law concepts of  restitution and 
disgorgement – technical legal terms we need not address here.  The FDA has other enforcement mechanisms, 
including issuing warning letters, injunctions, seizure, and criminal prosecutions (Pollard & Duvar, n.d.).   
6  Essentially, this assumption captures cases where the regulator makes and assessment and the firm pays the 
fine; that is, the firm never contests the regulators’ assessment.  Firms might contest the assessment, causing a 
suit to be filed either in an administrative action or an Article III court.  This potentially important consideration is 
beyond the scope of this analysis.   7 
 
(3)  μSAFE(A)=SA
s, S=0.5 and s=Cb=4; 
while the possibility that it makes food more unsafe decreases. 
(4)  μUNSAFE(A)=1-UA
u, U=0.75 and u-0.5. 
  Figure 1 plots 1- μSAFE(A) and μUNSAFE(A) for all A.  The specified membership functions describe a 
case where firms need to undertake a relatively high A to increase safety and decrease membership in 
not SAFE, but all positive As reduce the degree of UNSAFEness.  In such a case the regulator is likely 
either to consider a firm culpable unless it engages in a fairly large A (required to have any effect on 
safety), or to not consider it culpable at all (A=0 is reasonable), depending on the costliness of a bad 
event relative to the costliness of A. 
Figure 1. Degrees of membership in not SAFE and UNSAFE 
 
In order to obtain the probability that a bad event occurs, the memberships in these two sets are 
defuzzified using the following rule: 
(5)  Pr(A)=((1- μSAFE(A))+ μSAFE(A))/2. 
Finally, two additional parameters must be defined: K=2 and γ=0.5. The analysis used 21 values for A, in 
increments of 0.05 from 0 to 1 inclusively. 
 
Modeling a marketing order: heterogeneous firms 
By design, the modeling framework excludes the possibility that firms can benefit from cooperating over 
any aspect of production of marketing besides food safety-related activities.  Thus, the only way by firms 
can increase their joint profits through cooperation is by adjusting their amount of food safety activities.  
We consider two types of firm heterogeneity while maintaining a constant market size.  In the first case 
firms are heterogeneous in terms of their market shares while c(A) is the same for both firms and the 
firms must pay the same damages if a bad event occurs and the legal doctrine requires damages. In the 
second case firms are heterogeneous in terms of their profits from production and food safety activities, 
but must pay the same damages. Loosely speaking, the first case can be interpreted as a food safety 
action being a fixed cost, and the second as it being a variable cost.   
  In either case, if the firms form a marketing order they choose their actions in order to maximize 
joint profits, subject to the legal regime.
7
                                                           
7 A food safety-oriented marketing order could be introduced into the basic framework in many additional ways.  
For example, economies of scale in research might lead to a reduction in the cost of food safety actions, or an 
increase in efficacy.  Differentiation based on food safety may command a premium over competing products 
  Given the model specification, the only way in which a MO 8 
 
could do so is through its members’ choices of A. We consider two types of MOs.  In the first, the MO 
sets minimum standards for its members.  In the second, MO members are subject to a common 
standard.  We assume that firms cannot renege on their agreed-upon action choices in either type of 
MO, nor can they choose an action that is greater than that required by the common standard MO.  
Equivalently, we assume that the MO can enforce its action choices costlessly.  Firms have the option of 
forming a MO regardless of the liability rule in effect.   
  Voluntary marketing agreements regarding food safety practices can be loosely characterized as 
collective efforts to engage in greater efforts to promote food safety than undertaken by others in the 
industry.  In this two-firm framework, an incentive to undertake a voluntary marketing agreement 
corresponds to one firm choosing to undertake a higher action in the Nash equilibrium.   
 
Table 4. Profit-maximizing actions and social welfare by legal regime:  
Asymmetric firms (base values 0.5,1.5), revenues only 
Regime  Market structure  Actions  Profits  Social welfare 
No liability  Competitive  0.05, 0.10  1.01,3.02  2.017 
  Individual standard MO  0.15,0.15  1.00,3.04  2.024 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  1.00,3.04  2.024 
         
Strict liability  Competitive  0,0  1.00,3.00  2.000 
  Individual standard MO  0,0  1.00,3.00  2.000 
  Common standard MO  0,0  1.00,3.00  2.000 
         
Negligence (R=0.5)  Competitive  0.5,0.5  0.83,2.99  1.973 
  Individual standard MO  0.5,0.5  0.83,2.99  1.973 
  Common standard MO  0.5,0.5  0.83,2.99  1.973 
         
Negligence (Rnot SAFE=0)  Competitive  0.15,0.15  1.00,3.04  2.024 
  Individual standard MO  0.15,0.15  1.00,3.04  2.024 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  1.00,3.04  2.024 
         
Welfare maximization 
(no damages) 
Asymmetric   1,1  1.01,3.03  2.344 
  Symmetric  1,1  1.00,3.04  2.344 
 
Results 
Table 4  reports firms’ actions and profits and social welfare under competition and MOs for five 
regimes: no legal responsibility to pay damages, liability, negligence with an arbitrary R=0.5, negligence 
with a rule based on maximizing social welfare based only on information regarding each action’s 
membership in SAFE (Rnot SAFE), and the actions that maximize social welfare.
8
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regardless of whether or not a bad event occurs, or reduce the magnitude of the price shock associated with a bad 
event due to higher consumer confidence in the actions undertaken by the marketing order.  
  Firms are heterogeneous 
in market shares only.  Firm 2 is three times as large as firm 1.   Given the model specification, neither 
type of marketing order increases social welfare under liability or negligence doctrines.  In fact, social 
welfare is unaffected.  Thus, when the government implements either a crisp rule or a fuzzy standard 
there is no social benefit of implementing a MO.  There are no benefits to the firms, either.  However, if 
8 In some instances there are multiple symmetric competitive equilibria.  We report only the equilibrium with the 
largest As.  These equilibria are closest to the MO solutions. 9 
 
firms are not legally  responsible for paying damages  under any circumstances, either type of MO 
increases social welfare.  In this case, firm 1 must be to agree to form the MO.  
  Another comparison of note is that, relative to the case of no liability, welfare is reduced by the 
introduction of strict liability, or of negligence based on an arbitrary standard.  Welfare is not improved 
by the use of negligence based on a standard using the regulator’s best available information.   
Effectively, the voluntary formation of a marketing order in the absence of liability results in the same 
level of social welfare as the best-performing liability rule does.    If firms are sufficiently heterogeneous, 
they may, in this case, have an incentive to form a MO under a fuzzy negligence standard.  These final 
results are  consistent with industry members’ arguments that they should be allowed to institute 
collective voluntary arrangements, rather than be subject to regulation. Note also that even though 
welfare is the same, the distribution of welfare differs. Industry profits are greater under the MOs than 
under the negligence doctrine, and the costs to consumers are correspondingly greater.  
  Table 5 provides the same information as Table 4 when firm 2 is 12.3 times as large as firm 1. In 
this case the formation of a marketing order improves welfare under a negligence doctrine when the 
regulator specifies Rnot SAFE.  Holding all else equal, a greater difference in firms’ market shares makes it 
more likely that a MO will increase social welfare. As in the previous case the formation of a marketing 
order improves welfare in the absence of liability.  Under the remaining regimes social welfare is again 
unaffected. As in the previous case, the formation of a MO in the absence of liability results in welfare at 
least as large as under the liability rules. 
 
Table 5. Profit-maximizing actions and social welfare by legal regime:  
Asymmetric firms (0.15,1.85), revenues only 
Regime  Market structure  Actions  Profits  Social welfare 
No liability  Competitive  0.05,0.10  0.30,3.73  2.017 
  Individual standard MO  0.15,0.15  0.30,3.75  2.020 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  0.30,3.75  2.020 
         
Strict liability  Competitive  0,0  0.30,3.70  2.00 
  Individual standard MO  0,0  0.30,3.70  2.00 
  Common standard MO  0,0  0.30,3.70  2.00 
         
Negligence (R=0.5)  Competitive  0.5,0.5  0.07,3.74  1.973 
  Individual standard MO  0.5,0.5  0.07,3.74  1.973 
  Common standard MO  0.5,0.5  0.07,3.74  1.973 
         
Negligence  
(Rnot SAFE=0) 
Competitive  0.05,0.10  0.30,3.73  2.017 
  Individual standard MO  0.15,0.15  0.30,3.75  2.020 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  0.30,3.75  2.020 
         
Social welfare maximization 
(no damages) 
Asymmetric   1,1  -0.58,4.15  2.344 
  Symmetric  1,1  -0.58,4.15  2.344 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the same information as tables 4 and 5 for the second type of firm heterogeneity: 
firms are heterogeneous in their net revenues from production and pay the same fine  if they are 
responsible for a bad event. Introducing heterogeneity in costs has two effects, as seen when comparing 
tables 5 and 3.  First, unlike in table 3, in table 5 the formation of a MO of either type increases welfare 10 
 
when the regulator chooses his negligence standard (fuzzy standard) based on his information regarding 
membership in the fuzzy set SAFE as well as when firms are not liable.  Second, the action choices of an 
individual standard MO and common standard MO differ in both regimes where the formation of a MO 
increases welfare. The smaller firm, firm 2, is required to undertake a larger A.  This occurs because the 
price shock resulting from a bad event due to his choice of A imposes a larger cost on firm 2 than the 
reverse case.  Notably, the smaller firm’s profits and welfare are larger under a common standard MO 
than under an individual standard MO, while the larger firm’s profits are smaller.  Table 6  also 
demonstrates that the regulator can obtain as least as high a level of social welfare by allowing firms to 
form a MO as by imposing either a crisp rule or a fuzzy standard, as was the case when firms were 
heterogeneous only in their market shares.   
 
Table 6. Profit-maximizing actions and social welfare by legal regime:  
Asymmetric firms (base values  0.5,1.5), revenues and costs 
Regime    Actions  Profits  Social welfare 
No liability  Competitive  0.10,0.10  1.01,3.03  2.023 
  Individual standard MO  0.25,0.15  1.00,3.05  2.024 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  1.01,3.03  2.031 
         
Strict liability  Competitive  0,0  1.00,3.00  2.00 
  Individual standard MO  0,0  1.00,3.00  2.00 
  Common standard MO  0,0  1.00,3.00  2.00 
         
Negligence (R=0.5)  Competitive  0.5,0.5  0.95,2.86  1.973 
  Individual standard MO  0.5,0.5  0.95,2.86  1.973 
  Common standard MO  0.5,0.5  0.95,2.86  1.973 
         
Negligence  
(Rnot SAFE=0) 
Competitive  0.10,0.10  1.01,3.03  1.023 
  Individual standard MO  0.25,0.15  1.00,3.05  2.024 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  1.01,3.03  2.031 
         
Social welfare maximization 
(no damages) 
Asymmetric   1,1  0.89,2.67  2.34 
  Symmetric  1,1  0.89,2.67  2.34 
 
Comparing tables 6 and 7, a greater degree of heterogeneity in firms’ revenues increases the instances 
in which a MO increases social welfare.  As before, either type of MO increases welfare when firms have 
no liability and when the regulator chooses the negligence standard based on his information regarding 
the fuzzy set SAFE. In addition, under the arbitrary negligence standard an individual standard MO 
increases welfare.  Firm 1, the smaller firm, would have to be compensated in order to agree to form the 
individual standards MO under two of the three regimes.  
  The increase in the heterogeneity of the firms complicates the comparison of the social welfare 
obtained from firms forming a MO  and the regulator imposing a liability rule.  Here, forming an 
independent standard MO results in the highest level of social welfare under all regimes except for strict 
liability. (Under  a crisp strict  liability  rule  there is no welfare gain to forming either type of MO.) 
Excluding strict liability, the total welfare that results from forming an independent standard MO is 
independent of regime.  A common standard MO increases social welfare relative to the competitive 
case when firms are not liable, or liable under negligence with a standard based on the regulator’s 11 
 
information.  In contrast, the welfare gain to implementing an individual standard MO is greater under 
negligence with an arbitrary standard of 0.5 than under these two regimes. 
 
Table 7. Profit-maximizing actions and social welfare by legal regime:  
Asymmetric firms (0.15,1.85), revenues and costs 
Regime    Actions  Profits  Social welfare 
No liability  Competitive  0.1,0.1  0.3026,3.73  2.064 
  Individual standard MO  1,0.25  0.19,4.02  2.441 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  0.3034,3.74  2.082 
         
Strict liability  Competitive  0.0  0.30,3.70  2.000 
  Individual standard MO  0,0  0.30,3.70  2.000 
  Common standard MO  0,0  0.30,3.70  2.000 
         
Negligence (R=0.5)  Competitive  0.5,0.5  0.29,3.53  1.973 
  Individual standard MO  1,0.5  0.20,3.89  2.440 
  Common standard MO  0.5,0.5  0.29,3.53  1.973 
         
Negligence  
(Rnot SAFE=0) 
Competitive  0.1,0.1  0.30,3.73  2.064 
  Individual standard MO  1,0.25  0.19,4.02  2.441 
  Common standard MO  0.15,0.15  0.30,3.74  2.082 
         
Social welfare maximization 
(no damages) 
Asymmetric   1.0,0.35  0.19,4.00  2.469 
  Symmetric  1,1  0.27,3.30  2.344 
 
Implications and future research 
The results of this analysis has a number of implications for future research.  First, reducing ambiguity by 
improving the quality of the regulator’s information doesn’t always improve social welfare.   
Consequently, improving inspection processes or developing specific standards may not be the best use 
of limited government resources addressing food safety.  Researching new technologies or, under some 
conditions, encouraging the formation of voluntary industry organizations designed to enhance food 
safety may have a greater impact.  Regarding the latter, the analysis showed that MO formation will 
never reduce, and may improve, welfare relative to imposing either a strict liability rule or a fuzzy 
negligence standard.  Furthermore, in some cases growers may choose to form a voluntary marketing 
agreement that would improve social welfare.  In some cases, such a MO may require transfers to 
implement.  While transfers between private parties due to per unit assessments to fund marketing 
order activities may not be sufficient to induce implementation of the MO, additional transfers by the 
government to small growers may do so.   
  There are a number of caveats regarding this analysis. As is so often the case, these caveats 
suggest directions for future research.  First, the results are dependent on parameter values, functional 
forms, and the definitions of fuzzy set memberships and the defuzzification rule.  Sensitivity analysis is 
required to address the robustness of the findings to these definitions. One particularly important 
definition to examine is that of ambiguity in the regulator’s fuzzy negligence standard. Second, the 
analysis does not consider moral hazard.  A related assumption is that the analysis conflates growers 
and shipper/processors.  These assumptions may affect conclusions of the paper; however, given the 
ambiguity inherent in food safety and food safety regulation their effects may be less important than in 12 
 
“crisp” models. Third, the analysis is restricted to two firms who are assumed to comprise the entire 
market.  Limiting the analysis to two firms implies that any sort of collective organization includes all 
suppliers.  Increasing the number of firms would enrich the analysis of the role of voluntary 
organizations considerably. Finally, the analysis uses a static framework.  Including a dynamic framework 
would allow for the possibility of induced innovation in food safety provision activities. 
  The existing model provides another potentially fruitful direction for further research.  There are 
many differences in the availability and efficacy of food safety provision activities for fresh and 
processed foods.  Many of these differences can be  represented in terms of the memberships of 
activities in the SAFE and UNSAFE fuzzy sets.  Comparing these differences will enable the analysis of the 
effects of MO formation and different liability regimes in markets with different food safety 
characteristics based on empirical observation.     
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